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This paper analyzes the importance of retail consumers’ banking relationships for loan defaults 
using a unique, comprehensive dataset of over one million loans by savings banks in Germany. 
We find that loans of retail customers, who have a relationship with their savings bank prior to 
applying for a loan, default significantly less than customers with no prior relationship. We find 
relationships matter in different forms, scope, and depth. Importantly, though, even the simplest 
forms of relationships such as transaction accounts are economically meaningful in reducing 
defaults, even after controlling for other borrower characteristics as well as internal and external 
credit scores.  Our results suggest that relationships of all kinds have inherent private information 
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Non-Technical Summary 
This paper analyses the importance of relationships between banks and depositors on borrower 
default rates. Loan officers incorporate private information in the credit decision process as well 
as in monitoring. We ask, is this relationships specific information valuable to banks as well as 
borrowers? Are default rates effectively reduced? Does private information help banks to 
become better at screening and to what extend does it influence the monitoring process? In 
addition to that, we analyse borrower incentives to default conditioning on the intensity of the 
relation with the bank.  
 
We use a unique dataset that has information on consumer loans applied for as well as originated 
by savings banks in Germany.  Savings banks do 40% of retail banking in Germany, so this is a 
significant source of credit for retail customers. The sample spans the time period between 2004 
and 2008 and has information on the performance of more than 1 million loans made by 296 
different savings banks. The default rates for these loans are calculated in compliance with the 
Basel II requirements. In addition to the performance data, the dataset contains detailed 
information on loan and borrower characteristics and in particular on the existence and extent of 
prior relationships that loan applicants have had with the savings banks at which they apply for a 
new loan. These relationships comprise of the existence of a current or savings account, the 
usage of credit or debit cards, of credit lines, the amount of funds in these accounts as well as the 
existence and performance of a prior loan. The available data also include detailed information 
on each borrower, including age, income, employment status, and the length of the relationship 
with the bank.  
 
In other words, the data comprise information about the existence, scope and depth of the 
relationship and, in contrast to prior literature, not only related to repeat loan relationships, but 
also other (cross-selling) products, for example, checking and savings accounts at the time the 
customer applies for the loan. Using selection methods, it is possible to address the question 
whether banks use their private information rather in screening than in monitoring borrowers. 
Using additional information about transaction account behaviour of our sample borrowers, we 
are able to separate screening and monitoring from the question as to whether or not borrowers 
with relationships are less inclined to default. 
 
We find that loans of retail customers, who have a relationship with their savings bank prior to 
applying for a loan, default significantly less than customers with no prior relationship. We find 
relationships matter in different forms (transaction accounts, savings accounts, prior loans), in 
scope (credit and debit cards, credit lines), and depth (relationship length, utilization of credit 
line, money invested in savings account).   Importantly, though, even the simplest forms of 
relationships such as transaction accounts (e.g., savings or checking accounts) are economically 
meaningful in reducing defaults, even after controlling for other borrower characteristics as well 
as internal and external credit scores.  We are able to access data on loan applications to assess 
how banks screen.  We find that relationships are important in screening but even after taking 
screening into account relationships have a first order impact in reducing borrower default.  Our 
results suggest that relationships of all kinds have inherent private information and are valuable 
in screening, in monitoring, and in reducing consumers’ incentives to default.  6
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1. Introduction 
Understanding how banks make loans and under which conditions borrowers default on these 
loans is important and has been at the forefront of the current financial crisis.  An important 
question is how should the process of loan making by banks be regulated to minimize risks?  For 
example, should the loan making process be entirely codified so that the potential for discretion 
does not exist, and loans are made based on hard, verifiable information collected by the bank?  
Allowing discretion to the bank could allow for the information obtained from relationship 
specific assets to be incorporated to improve the quality of loans made. Likewise, what is the 
value of a bank relationship to a customer?  Is the bank better able to prevent default because of 
prior relationships? Is a borrower less inclined to default on a loan if she has an extensive 
relationship with his bank, because of the inherent value of the relationship? These are open 
questions that are of interest to academics, banks, consumers, and regulators. 
 
There is a vast theoretical literature on the relationships between banks and their customers.
1 
Boot (2000) states, “The modern literature on financial intermediaries has primarily focused on 
the role of banks as relationship lenders… (However) existing empirical work is virtually silent 
on identifying the precise sources of value in relationship banking.” The importance of these 




                                                 
1 See, for example, Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984, 1991), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Fama 
(1985), and Haubrich (1989). 
2 See James and Wier (1990), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Puri (1996), Billet, Flannery, and 
Garfinkel (1995), Drucker and Puri (2005), and Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2006). 7
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Our paper adds to this literature studying bank-depositor relationships. In particular, it focuses on 
the importance of existing relationships for both the bank, which can collect information, and the 
customer, who has an incentive to maintain his relationship, by analyzing the loan approval 
decision and subsequent loan performance. Given the significance of retail lending and deposit-
taking for banks, and given that banks are a valuable source of personal and consumer loans, 
understanding the role of bank and retail depositor relationships is important. We ask both, how 
and what kind of relationships matter in the granting of loans, as well as whether they affect 
default rates.   
 
The first key contribution of this paper is to recognize that relationships have multiple 
dimensions which is essential in understanding both how banks collect private information as 
well as how borrower and bank incentives are shaped. There are many different ways of thinking 
about relationships.  One could look at the length of relationships, the scope of relationships, or 
the kind of relationships - whether it is a simple transaction account or a multi-prong 
relationship.  The literature has largely defined relationships in the context of giving repeat loans 
to corporate firms, but in principle simple transaction relationships, or having multiple products 
with the bank could matter.
3 A second key contribution of our paper is that we examine the 
impact of different kinds of relationships that existed prior to granting the loan in reducing 
default rates. Specifically, we show that these relationships matter in various forms, scope, and 
depth, and even simple transaction or savings accounts make a difference. This is distinct from 
information obtained from concurrent transaction or checking accounts opened at the time of 
making the loan.  From a practical point of view, our results imply that banks can make better 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Santikian (2009) who studies banks’ profit margins based on the cross-selling of non-loan products to 
firms. 8
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credit decisions by requiring potential borrowers to open simple savings or checking accounts 
and observing their transactions before deciding on the loan application.  A third key 
contribution of this paper is that we examine the sources of value of relationships at the loan 
origination stage and find that relationships play an important role at screening loan applicants, 
suggesting that the private information inherent in relationships is important.  Even after taking 
screening into account, relationships still have a first order impact in reducing borrower defaults. 
This suggests a distinct value of existing relationships not just in screening but beyond 
potentially from better monitoring based on private information as well as reduced incentives to 
default by the customer. To the best of our knowledge, these results are new to the literature and 
illustrate the value of relationships to both banks and customers.  
 
A major limitation in studying the importance of retail banking relationships is the availability of 
data in the context of an appropriate experiment design.  This paper accesses a unique, 
proprietary dataset which comprises the universe of loans made by savings banks in Germany as 
well as their ex-post performance. These data are recorded on a monthly basis for each individual 
loan and are provided by the rating subsidiary of the German Savings Banks Association 
(DSGV). The data span the time period between November 2004 and June 2008 and comprise 
information on the performance of more than 1 million loans made by 296 different savings 
banks. The default rates for these loans are calculated in compliance with the Basel II 
requirements. In addition to the performance data, we have detailed information on loan and 
borrower characteristics and in particular on the existence and extent of prior relationships that 
loan applicants have had with the savings banks at which they apply for a new loan. These 
relationships comprise the existence of a current or savings account, the usage of credit or debit 9
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cards, the amount of funds in these accounts as well as the existence and performance of a prior 
loan. The available data also comprise detailed information on each borrower, including age, 
income, employment status, and the length of the relationship with the bank. All characteristics 
are taken from an internal scoring system that is used by all our sample banks and available for 
all loan applications. In addition, for a subset of the loan applications we also have detailed 
borrower information that is not part of the internal scoring system and only known to the 
savings banks. Finally, for a substantial number of loan applications we also have information 
from an external scoring system. The important aspect for our analysis of the bank behavior is 
that the scoring system provides a credit assessment of each loan applicant and a 
recommendation for the loan decision, but the final decision remains with the bank and its loan 
officers. The final loan granting decision is thus made by each individual bank, using its own 
discretion and taking into account its respective ability and willingness to take on risks. 
Furthermore, loan officers have some discretion themselves as to whether or not they approve a 
loan application. In other words, there are some subjective elements in the screening process that 
might very well be different for each respective bank and loan officer. These data thus provide 
an ideal opportunity to investigate the sources of value of relationships from being able to collect 
more information on a customer. 
 
Our first set of tests examines whether loans with prior relationships have lower default rates 
after controlling for observable borrower characteristics. We use a number of proxies for the 
different forms of relationships: First, we examine the impact of relationships through 
transaction accounts on default rates using five measures: (i) the existence of checking accounts, 
(ii) relationship length, (iii) the usage of debit and credit cards, (iv) the existence of credit lines 10
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and (v) the usage of credit lines. Second, we examine the impact of relationships through savings 
accounts on default rates using two measures: (i) the existence of savings accounts and (ii) the 
amount of assets held in the savings accounts. Third, we examine the impact of relationships 
through repeat lending on default rates. To summarize our results, we find that relationships that 
have been built prior to loan origination significantly reduce the probability of default of 
subsequently issued loans after controlling for borrower risk characteristics as well as internal 
and external credit scores. This result is consistent with relationships both providing banks with a 
unique advantage in monitoring their borrowers and creating incentives for customers to default 
less often. We also examine the relative importance of each of our relationship proxies. While 
prior literature highlights the importance of repeat lending relationships, this proxy turns out to 
have a rather small impact on default rates relative to, for example, transaction account related 
measures.  
 
While these results establish a correlation between having prior relationships and default rates, 
one can still ask what determines a relationship itself. If relationships are not random but are 
related to certain (unobservable) borrower characteristics, relationship borrowers might be of 
higher quality which explains lower default rates. We address this using a simultaneous equation 
model in which we augment the main probit equation with an additional probit equation that 
explains what factors determine relationships. To facilitate identification, we include an 
instrument that proxies for the availability of savings banks to customers in their region. We test 
the null hypothesis that both probit equations are uncorrelated and cannot reject this hypothesis 
at conventional levels. These results suggest that there are no unobservable borrower 
characteristics that bias our estimates of the impact of prior relationships on default rates. 11
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In a second set of tests we examine the sources of value of relationships. Do existing banking 
relationships with retail consumers help banks to better screen these consumers when they apply 
for loans and thus to reduce the default rates for these loans? Is there value to relationships 
beyond screening? If so, does it stem from private information or other sources? 
 
In order to separate screening from other benefits of relationships, we need to explicitly analyze 
the loan granting process as we cannot observe the loan performance for those customers whose 
loan application has been rejected. We use a simultaneous equation model augmenting the 
default model with a second probit model that explains the loan granting decision. We find that 
borrower characteristics that increase the likelihood of getting credit are negatively correlated 
with default rates, which is consistent with banks using a screening policy to reduce default rates. 
We further test the null hypothesis that the error terms of the loan granting and the default model 
are uncorrelated (i.e. discretion does not matter for screening) and reject this hypothesis at any 
confidence level. We also find that after controlling for sample selection, our proxies for 
relationships are still negative and significant. Relationships thus provide value to banks in 
screening, but they also provide value beyond this. 
 
To investigate further the source of value of relationships, we make use of the detailed 
information about transaction account behavior for a subset of our sample borrowers, which is 
only known to the bank, but not included in the internal rating. Our results suggest that private 
information is important both for screening and subsequent monitoring, but the different 
relationship proxies still have explanatory power even after controlling for private information. 12
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These results suggest that other factors beyond private information are important for loan 
performance and borrower defaults.  One potential explanation of our results is that there are 
reduced borrower incentives to default because of the potential value of relationships to the 
borrower. 
 
Our paper adds to the existing literature in several ways. There is a recent literature that analyzes 
the benefits of bundling loans and checking accounts (Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2007) 
and Norden and Weber (2009)).
4 These papers explore the information banks gain over the 
duration of the loans from checking account activity. Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2007) find 
that transaction accounts provide financial intermediaries with a stream of information for the 
monitoring of small-business borrowers that gives them an advantage over other lenders.
5 
Similarly, Norden and Weber (2009) show that checking account activity provides valuable 
information for banks as an early warning signal for the default of small firms and their 
subsequent loan contract terms. Related to these two papers, Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, and 
Souleles (2009) document for credit card customers that monitoring and thus the availability of 
information on the changes in customer behavior result in an advantage to relationship banking. 
Our paper differs from theirs along several dimensions. While it is common to ask borrowers 
taking a loan to open an account and important to study how the information in the account helps 
the bank, i.e. instead of analyzing the benefits of providing jointly a loan and a checking account 
to the same borrower, we examine the impact of relationships that existed prior to granting the 
loan. Next, we show that relationships matter in various forms, scope and depth. Further, instead 
                                                 
4 This literature is related but distinct from the literature examining the importance of relationships for small firm 
credit (Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) . 
5 For small and medium-sized business borrowers, there is also a growing literature on the collection and use of soft 
information (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2007) as well as the use of discretion by banks (Cerqueiro, Degryse, and 
Ongena, 2007). 13
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of analyzing the behavior of one bank we examine the loan making decision of 296 different 
banks. Finally, we find evidence suggesting screening, monitoring, and borrower incentives as 
distinct sources of value of relationships. Our paper also adds to the literature on traditional bank 
specialness (such as James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Best and Zhang (1993), 
Billet et al. (1995) and Dahiya et al. (2003)). These papers document a positive impact of loan 
announcements on a borrower’s stock return at time of loan origination and provide evidence 
that banks perform a special role in the financial system as monitors and information providers. 
Our results are consistent with the traditional view: relationships are valuable in screening and 
monitoring borrowers. However, we also find evidence for bank specialness beyond the 
“traditional role” as a strong relationship with a bank reduces a customer’s incentives to default. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data that are used for 
our analyses and provides summary statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses on 
private information, Section 4 shows the results suggesting borrower incentives to default, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
A. Loan and Borrower Characteristics 
We obtain the performance data for the universe of consumer loans by savings banks in 
Germany.
6 These loans are usually given on an unsecured basis, i.e. without collateral, and it is 
                                                 
6 The sample thus does not comprise applications for mortgage loans, checking accounts, or credit cards. Credit 
cards are used differently in Germany than in the United States. They are issued by a bank and are directly linked to 
the credit card holder’s current account in that bank. Payments are automatically deducted from this checking 14
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not possible to sell or securitize these loans unless they default.
7 The data for these loans are 
recorded on a monthly basis for each individual loan and are provided by the rating subsidiary of 
the German Savings Banks Association (DSGV). The data span the time period between 
November 2004 and June 2008 and comprise information on the performance of 1,068,000 loans 
made by 296 different savings banks. The default rates for these loans are calculated in 
compliance with the Basel II requirements.
8 According to this definition, a borrower defaults if 
one of the following events occurs: (i) the borrower is 90 days late on payment of principal or 
interest, (ii) the borrower’s repayment becomes unlikely, (iii) the bank builds a loan loss 
provision, (iv) the liabilities of the borrower are restructured with a loss to the bank, (v) the bank 
calls the loan, (vi) the bank sells the loan with a loss, or (vii) the banks needs to write-off the 
loan.
9,
 Our data includes flags for each of these default events and the associated date.
10 Defaults 
are uniquely determined by each given savings bank; there are no cross-default clauses in 
German retail lending. In addition to performance data, we have detailed information on all the 
loan and borrower characteristics that the bank employs to assess a borrower’s creditworthiness. 
In particular, we have information on the existence and extent of prior relationships that loan 
applicants have had with the savings banks at which they apply for a new loan. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
account at the end of each month. Customers can thus not default on their credit cards, but their payments may 
exceed the credit line on their current account. In this case, the bank faces the repayment and default risk. 
7 Given some public debate about the lending practices at one given savings bank, savings banks made clear to their 
retail customers that no loan would be sold. 
8  See “Solvabilitätsverordnung (SolvV)  §125”, the “Baseler Rahmenvereinbarung Tz. 452-453 and the “EU-
Richtlinienvorschlag, Anhang VII, Teil 4”. 
9 The second event is used if the default cannot be categorized into one of the other default events. For example, if 
the repayment of the borrower is ‘unlikely’, but the bank does not build a loan loss provision because the loan is 
fully collateralized, this category is chosen as default event. 
10 Sales and securitizations of individual loans are uncommon in Germany, and when they occur they are for 
commercial and industrial loans rather than retail credit.  15
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There are a number of unique characteristics of these data that make them particularly suitable 
for the purpose of our study: First, they contain detailed information on individual loan 
applicants, including information on their credit risk and their relationship status. Second, they 
comprise detailed monthly information on the performance of each individual loan and in 
particular its default. Third, the data on both the loan applicants and loan performance are highly 
reliable, as they comply with the Basel II requirements. Fourth, the data are very comprehensive 
as they cover the bulk of the universe of savings banks in Germany, which hold a market share in 
retail lending of more than 40 percent in Germany. Also, the “regional principle” is an important 
institutional setting associated with German savings banks. This implies that borrowers can only 
do business with savings banks within the region they are domiciled in. Consequently, we do not 
have to worry about endogenous matching of borrowers and banks in our sample. Finally, all 
borrower and relationship characteristics are taken from an internal scoring system that is used 
by all our sample banks.
11 The interesting feature for our analysis is that the scoring system does 
provide a credit assessment of the applicant, but it serves as a guideline rather than a mandatory 
prescription. The final loan granting decision is made by each individual bank also using its own 
discretion and taking into account its respective ability and willingness to take on risks. 
Furthermore, loan officers have some discretion themselves as to whether or not they approve a 
loan application. In other words, there are some subjective elements associated with the banks’ 
screening process which might very well be different for each respective bank.  Overall, the large 
and comprehensive sample of loans by savings banks and the detailed information on loan 
applicants’ relationship status and credit risk as well as on the performance of the approved loans 
provides a unique opportunity to analyze the sources of value of relationships. 
                                                 
11 In principle, savings banks can also use information from external rating agencies, but they have to pay for this 
information. It is thus available only for 86,628 loan applications. We use this information in our analysis shown in 
Table 9.  16
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for loans and borrowers. Over the first twelve month 
after the loan origination, 0.6% of the approved loans default according to the above default 
definition. The default rate increases to 1.3% when the loan performance over the full sample 
period is considered.
12 Loan applicants have an average monthly income of €1,769, and most of 
them are in the age cohort between 30 and 45 years, followed by the age cohorts between 50 and 
60 years.
13 The loan repayment in percent of the borrower’s income amounts to more than 20% 
only for 6.6% of the borrowers, for 54.5% of our borrowers it is less than 20%. For all other 
borrowers, this information remains undisclosed. Most borrowers work in the service industry 
and have been in their current job for more than two years. 
 
The internal rating system does not comprise information on loan amounts, maturities, or interest 
rates. However, more than 20 million monthly performance observations allow us to make 
inferences in terms of loan maturities. Note that we can split our sample loans into two 
categories, (1) loans that have either been repaid in full or defaulted, and (2) loans that have not 
been repaid and have not yet defaulted or loans in default for which the banks have not closed 
the account in expectation of future payments. In both categories, we analyze loans that have not 
defaulted and infer that the average maturity is 14.5 months in both categories The performance 
data also allow making inferences that pertain to loan amounts. We know the monthly repayment 
rate (i.e. interest plus principal repayment) and can calculate the loan maturity of the repaid loan. 
                                                 
12 These relatively low default rates are very typical for consumer loans in Germany. According to 2008 estimates 
by Creditreform (a German business information service), the average default rates for consumer loans in Germany 
amount to 2-3% over the lifetime of the loan, while they amount to 5-6% in the UK and more than 6% in the United 
States.(http://www.creditreform.de/Deutsch/Creditreform/Info-
Center/Fachartikel/International_Business/Archiv/Verschuldung.jsp) 
13 The average monthly income of our sample borrowers corresponds to the average German inhabitant. For 
example, according to the German Census Bureau, in 2006, the median net income in Germany was € 1,800 per 
person which is very similar to the loan applicants in our sample. 17
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We thus can calculate the total repayment of these borrowers. On average, borrowers repay EUR 
237 per month and EUR 3,100 in total. 
 
B. Relationship Characteristics 
Table 2 provides detailed information on the loan applicants’ relationship status including its 
length and scope. It reports, in particular, whether loan applicants have an existing relationship 
with the savings bank at which they apply for a new consumer loan and, if so, which types of 
products they currently use or have used so far. Only 2.5% of the loan applicants have had no 
relationship with their savings banks prior to the loan application. At the same time, many of the 
existing customers have been customers of the savings banks for a substantial period of time. For 
example, 47.6% of the loan applicants have been customers of the savings banks for more than 
15 years, and more than 80% of them have been customers for at least 5 years.  
 
The majority of customers have checking accounts with the savings banks prior to the loan 
application. Checking accounts can be combined with debit and credit cards. The combination of 
debit and credit cards is the most common type among customers; 46.5% of them have both 
types of cards. 3.8% of the customers only have a debit card, while 18.3% of the customers only 
have a credit card. 28.9% of the customers have no cards. Furthermore, 94.5% of the loan 
applicants have an existing credit line at the time when they ask for a loan. These credit lines are 
not used in 30.1% of the cases. If they are used, the usage ranges mostly between 20 % and 80% 
of the limit of the credit line. 
 18
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The data set not only contains information on the checking accounts that loan applicants hold at 
the savings banks, but also on their assets and prior loans. Table 2 shows that only 23.2% of the 
borrowers have no savings account with their savings bank. While 19.7% of the loan applicants 
have assets of less than €50, 36.3% have assets between €50 and €2,000, and 18.5% have assets 
of more than €2,000. A substantial share of the borrowers already had prior loan lending 
relationships with their savings bank before the current loan. 19.2% of the loan applicants have 
had a loan in the past, and 12.1%, 17.4%, and 19.2% of loan applicants have had a loan within 
the last year, the last two years, and the last three years, respectively. 
 
 
3. Empirical Results on Private Information 
Our objective in this paper is to examine the sources of value of relationships in reducing default 
rates on consumer loans. 
 
A. Univariate Results 
To analyze whether relationships reduce default rates, we first examine the average 12-month 
default rates in subsamples of relationships versus non-relationship borrowers
14 and find 
significant differences. While the average default rate is 0.6% for relationship borrowers, it is 
1.6% for non-relationship borrowers, respectively. The difference is significant at the 1 percent 
level. We also analyze differences in ex-ante borrower risk. More precisely, we compare the risk 
distribution of loans given to relationship versus non-relationship customers using Cramer’s V 
which is a Chi-Square measure taking into account the number of observations in each 
                                                 
14 We define a relationship borrower as someone who has a transaction account relationship with the savings bank 
before applying for a loan. 19
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subsample. We cannot reject the null that the risk distribution does not differ between both 
subsamples (Cramer’s V is 0.045). In other words, while we find significant differences in 
default rates, we cannot find differences in ex-ante borrower risk which suggests that 
relationships are of first order importance in explaining as to why relationship borrowers exhibit 
significantly lower default rates.  
 
We next test the performance of consumer loans against a number of variables that capture the 
existence, length, and scope of the relationship that a customer has with her savings bank. The 
results are reported in Table 3 and show that customers with relationships, and in particular with 
more intense relationships, default less often than other customers and that these results are 
highly significant both from an economic and a statistical perspective.  
 
As the first piece of evidence, model (1) of Table 3 shows that customers with an existing 
relationship have a 1.0% lower default rate than customers with no existing relationship. This 
difference in default rates is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is economically large 
given the average default rate amounts to only 0.6% and corresponds to the difference in default 
rates of relationship (0.6%) versus non-relationship loans (1.6%). Further, the difference in 
default rates between new and existing customers is more than 1.5 times higher than the 
unconditional mean. Model (2) shows that the default rates monotonically decrease with the 
length of existing relationship. The benchmark case here is customers with a relationship of more 
than 15 years. The default rates for customers with relationships between 9 and 15 years are 
0.2% higher than for the benchmark case, and they increase up to 1.5% for relationships of less 
than two years. 20
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The results in model (3) of Table 3 suggest that default rates decrease with the scope and thus the 
intensity of the relationship between customer and bank. We introduce four indicator variables 
equal to 1 if the borrower has (i) a credit and a debit card, (ii) only a debit card, (iii) only a credit 
card or (iv) neither a credit nor a debit card. Borrowers without prior relationships are the 
omitted group. All coefficients on these indicator variables are negative and significant 
suggesting that relationship customers are less likely to default which is consistent with our 
previous finding. Nonetheless, the biggest reduction in default rates is associated with borrowers 
which have both a debit and credit card (only a debit card), which default 1.2% (1.1%) less often 
relative to non-relationship customers. Model (4) shows that default rates also depend on the 
existence of prior credit lines. The loans by customers with existing credit lines loans default by 
0.6% less. Model (5) considers in more detail the actual usage of these credit lines. Customers 
with credit lines have a higher default rate than customers without credit line only if their usage 
is larger than 150% of the credit line. For all other customers with credit lines, the default rates 
are significantly lower than for the benchmark group rates. In general, the default rates are 
positively correlated with the usage of the credit line, i.e. customers with a positive account 
balance exhibit the lowest default rates. Model (6) of Table 3 combines the different measures 
used so far and looks at them simultaneously. The results are very similar to the previous results, 
in particular the relationship length and the usage of debit and credit cards are still negatively 
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Starting with model (7), we analyze the effect of savings accounts on default rates. The results 
show that the existence of a savings account decreases default rates by 0.5%. Model (8) shows 
that customers with no savings accounts and with savings accounts of less than 50 Euros have a 
0.7% and 0.6% higher default rate, respectively, than customers with more than 2.000 Euros on 
their savings account. Overall, the volume of assets on a savings account is negatively correlated 
with customer default rates; even customers with savings account assets of more than 50 but less 
than 2.000 Euros are more likely to default than customers with assets of more than 2.000 Euros. 
 
These results provide initial evidence that customers with existing relationships with the savings 
bank at which they apply for a loan have lower default rates and that these default rates further 
decrease with the length and scope of the relationships.  
 
 
B. Multivariate Results 
In this section, we analyze whether existing relationships reduce the default probability of 
consumer loans controlling for a wide array of borrower characteristics. Our analysis proceeds in 
two steps. We start by reporting the results separately for customers who have held transaction 
accounts, savings accounts, and had repeat lending relationships with their savings banks before 
they receive the current loan. Then we combine these measures in one specification in order to 
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B.1. Relationships from Transaction Accounts 
Table 4 reports the results for customers who have had a transaction account with their savings 
bank before applying for a loan. This table presents the results of a probit regression. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the borrower defaults within the first 12 
months after loan origination. Our main inference variables are relationships characteristics as a 
result of relationships via transaction account (relationship length, credit and debit cards, credit 
lines and usage of credit lines). Models (2) to (6) consider those borrowers that have a checking 
account with the savings bank (i.e. we drop loans by “new customers”). In model (2), the omitted 
relationship variable is customers with a relationship longer than 15 years; in model (3) 
borrowers without a debit and credit card are omitted; in model (5) customers without credit 
lines are omitted; in model (6) customers with a relationship longer than 15 years, the group of 
customers with no credit and debit card and without credit line are simultaneously omitted. The 
coefficients for borrower industries
15  as well as intercept and time fixed effects are not shown. 
Only the marginal effects are shown. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at 
the bank level are shown in parentheses (Petersen (2009)). The control variables are the monthly 
income of the loan applicant, her repayment burden, which is measured by the ratio of the 
expected monthly loan repayment amount - if the loan application is approved - and the available 
income, the loan applicant’s age as well as her job stability.
16 This is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the borrower has been in her current job for more than two years and 0 otherwise. 
The analysis also controls for the industry in which the borrower works and includes time fixed 
                                                 
15 “Industry” has to be understood in a very broad sense and comprises the most important industries borrower work 
in, for example, the  service sector, public sector, construction, whether the borrower is unemployed or retired, but 
also the following industries: communications and information; energy and water supply, mining; hotel and catering; 
municipalities; agriculture; banking; insurance; not for profit company. But it also comprises: housewife; apprentice; 
high school student; student; army; houseman and civil service. 
16 All variables are defined in Appendix I. 23
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effects. The results in Table 4 show that default rates are decreasing in the borrower’s income 
and tend to increase in her repayment burden. The default for this variable is a ratio that exceeds 
20% of the loan applicant’s monthly income. The borrower’s age does not have a significant 
effect on default rates for borrowers below the age of 30 in some models, in comparison to the 
default age of larger than 60 years. However, borrowers between the age of 30 and 60 have a 
higher default probability than borrowers at the age of 60 and above throughout. Job stability 
also has an important impact on default rates. Customers who have been in their current job for 
less than two years default 0.3% to 0.5% more often than customers who have been in their 
current job for more than 2 years. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
The coefficients of our relationship proxies are in most cases significant at the 1% level and 
similar in magnitude compared to Table 3. As shown in model (1), the existence of a relationship 
lowers the default probability by 0.6%. Model (2) shows the results for different relationships 
length categories. The results suggest that defaults decrease with the length of a relationship and 
are least likely for the customers with the longest relationship duration. Borrowers with a 
relationship length less than 2 years have a 1.4% higher probability to default compared to 
customers with more than 15 years of relationships, ceteris paribus. Apparently, even the 
existence and the first few months of a relationship have a significant effect on default rates. This 
finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence we obtain talking to loan officers at a large private 
bank in India who does lending to SMEs that are also difficult to evaluate. One of their key 
models is to ask firms to open a checking account and observe them for 6 months before making 
a loan decision.  The loan officers claim they could substantially reduce default rates with this 24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1395
November 2011
model. It is noteworthy that the anecdotal evidence from India matches our results on retail 
lending in Germany.   
 
Model (3) takes into account the intensity of a relationship by analyzing the impact of different 
combinations of credit and debit cards that transaction account customers had before applying 
for a loan. Customers that had both credit and debit cards or simply debit cards have the lowest 
default probability and have 0.3% lower default probability than customers who have held 
neither a credit nor a debit card. Model (4) tests for the effect of the existence of a credit line in a 
customer’s transaction account. The results suggest that that the existence of a credit line 
significantly lowers the customer’s default probability. Model (5) considers credit lines again 
more carefully, and the results suggest that the usage of credit lines is positively correlated with 
default which is consistent with the findings of Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (2007) and 
Norden and Weber (2009). The coefficients are very similar to those in the previous univariate 
analysis. Finally, model (6) considers the different relationship variables simultaneously. The 
results are again very similar to those for the separate analysis of the different characteristics. 
Taken together, the results for the transaction accounts suggest that the existence of a prior 
relationship between bank and customer reduces the subsequent loan default rates for the 
customer, and that these default rates decrease in particular for longer and more intense 
relationships. 
 
B.2. Relationships from Savings Accounts 
Table 5 repeats the previous analysis for customers who have held a savings account before 
receiving a consumer loan using probit regressions. The dependent variable is a binary variable 25
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equal to 1 if the borrower defaults within the first 12 months after loan origination. Our main 
inference variables are relationships characteristics as a result of relationships via savings 
account (the existence of savings accounts and assets held in these accounts). In model (2), the 
omitted relationship variable is assets > 2,000 Euros. The coefficients for borrower industries (as 
described in Appendix I) as well as intercept and time fixed effects are not shown. Only the 
marginal effects are reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at the bank 
level are shown in parentheses. The control factors are the same as before and comprise the 
borrower’s income, her repayment burden, her age as well as her employment status as 
characterized by her job stability and the industry in which she works. The impact of the control 
variables is very similar to the earlier results in Table 4. In particular, borrowers tend to default 
less with an increase in their monthly income and when they are older than 60 years, while they 
tend to default more with an increase in their repayment burden. Customers also default more 
often when they have only been in their current job for less than two years.  
 
The relationship variables are again highly significant and carry the expected sign. Model (1) 
shows that customers who no savings accounts when applying for a consumer loan have a 
significantly higher default probability than customers with savings accounts. Model (2) analyzes 
whether or not the amount of assets held in these accounts is important. We split theses amounts 
in different size categories where the asset class of more than €2,000 is omitted. In comparison to 
the omitted group, customers with assets between €50 and €2,000 have a slightly higher 
likelihood of defaulting, and this increase in default likelihood amounts to 0.4% for customers 
with assets of less than €50 and 0.5% for customers with no assets. Thus the assets that a 
customers holds with a bank when applying for a loan have significant predictive power for the 26
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likelihood that the loan will finally be repaid, even after controlling for several important 
borrower characteristics.  
 
B.3. Repeat Lending Relationships 
Table 6 considers the impact of repeat lending relationships on subsequent consumer loan 
defaults in the same way as the previous analyses consider the impact of transaction and savings 
accounts and their characteristics on these defaults using probit regressions. The dependent 
variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the borrower defaults within the first 12 months after 
loan origination. Our main inference variables are relationships characteristics based on repeat 
lending with different look-back windows. Prior Loan within 2 yr (1yr) look-back are dummy 
variables equal to 1 if the borrower was granted  a loan within  2 years (1 year) prior to the 
current loan.
17  # Prior Loan Defaults measures the number of loans the borrower defaulted on in 
the past and which were originated during our sample period. The coefficients for borrower 
industries as well as intercept and time fixed effects are not shown. Only the marginal effects are 
reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at the bank level are shown in 
parentheses. The control variables are thus again the same ones as before and comprise several 
important borrower characteristics. In the same way as before, loan default rates decrease for 
borrowers with higher income and increase for borrowers with a higher debt repayment burden 
as measured by the ratio of the monthly repayment amount and the available monthly income. 
For the age cohorts, all age cohorts default significantly more often than those customers with 
age 60 and above. Finally, customers with less time on their current job default more often than 
other customers.  
 
                                                 
17 We do not have information on prior loans which were granted to our sample borrowers before our sample period. 27
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The relationships variables of interest are the existence of a prior loan relationship and how long 
this relationship dates back. Model (1) shows the results for the existence of a prior loan 
relationship and prior default. The results suggest that the existence of a prior loan relationship 
significantly reduces the default likelihood by 0.3%. As expected, whether or not a borrower 
defaulted on a prior loan increases the likelihood of default on the current loan by 2.2%. Models 
(2) and (3) consider whether the prior loan was granted within the last 2 or 1 years before the 
current loan, the results, however, do not change compared to model (1). 
 
B.4. Multiple Relationships and Default Rates 
The results so far consistently show that customer relationships significantly reduce the 
likelihood of default. This result holds – in separate analyses - for customers who have had prior 
transaction accounts, savings accounts, and consumer loans, and the results are particularly 
strong for longer and more intense relationships in each of these cases. Clearly, customers often 
have more than one of these relationships with their savings bank, e.g. they have both a 
transaction account and a savings account. Thus it is important to consider the relative 
importance of these different relationships. Table 7 reports the results for the simultaneous 
consideration of the different relationships variables that are tested separately in Tables 4 to 6. 
This table presents the results of a probit regression. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the borrower defaults within the first 12 months after loan origination. Model (1) 
repeats the analysis from model (6) in Table 4 and model (2) adds whether or not the borrower 
also had a savings account. Model (3) considers whether borrowers had simultaneously checking 
and savings accounts at their bank. Model (4) adds whether or not the borrower had a prior loan 
during our sample period controlling for previous loan defaults to model specification (2). The 28
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coefficients for borrower industries (as described in Appendix I) as well as intercept, bank and 
time fixed effects are not shown. Only the marginal effects are shown. Heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors clustered at the bank level are shown in parentheses. The control 
factors are the same ones as before and comprise again the borrower’s income and debt 
repayment burden as well her age and employment status. The results for these control factors 
are very similar to those obtained before.  
 
Model (2) adds whether or not borrowers have savings account to model (1). The coefficients 
hardly change and the magnitude of the coefficients is higher for the variables associated with 
checking accounts. As there is a probably an overlap in borrowers which have both checking and 
savings accounts, we model this explicitly in model specification (3). Model (3) shows that if 
borrowers have both a checking and a savings account before applying for a loan, relationship 
specific information obtained from checking accounts is important. The coefficients of savings 
accounts as well as the interaction term are insignificant. Model (4) adds whether or not the 
borrower had a loan prior to the current loan. Again, the coefficient of this variable is smaller 
compared to the checking account variables. 
 
Taken together, the multivariate specifications shown in Table 4, 5, 6, and 7 control for several 
detailed borrower characteristics, and the results show that – even after controlling for these 
characteristics  – relationships are valuable to banks. In particular, our results suggest that 
relationships that exist prior to applying for the current loan give banks an advantage in 
monitoring the borrowers and reduce default rates. Furthermore, they suggest that relationship 
specific information from checking accounts is relatively more valuable compared to savings 29
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accounts or repeat lending relationships. We next extend the previous analysis in two ways to 
shed more light on the underlying mechanisms for our results and to check their robustness.  
 
B.5. Internal and External Ratings 
First, we employ the internal credit score used by the bank instead of controlling explicitly for 
the different borrower characteristics. This allows us to see whether relationships provide value 
even above and beyond the information captured in the internal credit score, which represents the 
key building block of a bank’s credit decision. The results are presented in Table 8. The results 
for the internal rating classes show that the internal rating classes are consistent and capture well 
the customers’ default risk. The default rates decrease monotonically for higher internal rating 
classes as compared to rating class 12, which is the default and worst rating class employed. This 
pattern holds for each of the six models presented in Table 8. More importantly for the purpose 
of our paper, all the relationship variables remain significant and of similar magnitude as in the 
previous specifications. Model 1 shows that the existence of a relationship lowers the likelihood 
of a borrower default by 0.3%. Likewise and in the same way as before, the length of a 
relationship is negatively related to the likelihood of default. While it increases by 1.2% for 
customers with a relationship of less than 2 years default, it only increases by 0.2% for customers 
with a relationship between 9 and 15 years, both in comparison to the default of relationships of 
more than 15 years. Model 3 and Model 4 show the respective value for the existence of credit 
and debit cards as well as credit lines: The more information is provided by the relationships 
through existing checking accounts, the more valuable these relationships are. Finally, Model 5 
and 6 show the results for relationships through savings accounts and prior loans, respectively. 
The results suggest that the existence of a savings account reduces the likelihood of default by 30
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0.3%, while the existence of a prior loan reduces this likelihood by 0.4%. After controlling for 
internal credit scores, the results are thus very similar to those obtained before. 
 
Second, we employ a loan applicant’s external rating as an additional control variable. The 
external credit score is provided to the savings banks by a German credit bureau, and it is 
available for a subsample of 86,628 loan applications. We construct eight different rating classes 
based on the external credit score with 1 being the lowest risk. The average rating is 4.3. 
Controlling for external credit bureau information allows us to make sure that our results are in 
fact due to the information about a specific customer that is generated from the relationship with 
the savings bank and not to any other information that is obtained from external parties which is 
available to outside (i.e. non-relationship) lenders. The results are presented in Table 9. We find 
that high quality customers based on the external credit score are less likely to default. For 
example, customers with the highest external rating class are 0.3% less likely to default 
compared to customers in rating class 8 (the omitted group). The coefficients of our relationship 
proxies are very similar to those before. For example, the coefficient for the existence of a 
relationship in Model 1 is identical to that in Table 4. The coefficients for the length and 
intensity of a relationship in Model 2 and Model 3 are again similar, but slightly smaller than 
those in Table 4, implying that there is indeed valuable information captured in the external 
ratings. Finally, the existence of a credit line (Model 4), a savings account (Model 5), and a prior 
loan (Model 6) are shown to reduce customer default rates. Taken together, the key results 
remain robust even after explicitly controlling for internal and external ratings; relationships 
provide information above and beyond the existing information from internal and external 
sources. 31
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B.6. Endogeneity of bank-depositor relationships 
The previous sections established that relationships reduce the likelihood of borrower default. 
We argued that relationship specific information improves banks’ monitoring ability which 
results in lower default rates. However, the relationship between banks and borrowers is unlikely 
to be exogenous and banks might establish and continue relationships only with high quality 
customers. We use a wide array of borrower characteristics such as income, age, and 
employment among others to control for observed borrower heterogeneity, but relationship and 
non-relationship borrowers might still be different on an unobserved dimension that we are not 
able to control for in our models. If this was indeed the case, it would be less clear to what extent 
our results are driven by relationships rather than unobserved higher quality of relationship 
customers.  
 
Before we proceed with formal tests to address this, we note that there are at least two arguments 
to support the notion that relationships are unlikely to be endogenous. First, as mentioned earlier, 
we use extensive borrower controls to net out any differences between relationship and non-
relationship borrowers. Further, the risk distribution of both types of borrowers is not 
significantly different, i.e. they are not different based on ex-ante risk. The second argument is 
based on the institutional setting in German banking. Savings banks are mandated to serve local 
customers and provide financial services (and transaction accounts in particular) to all customers 
in their region. Savings banks are therefore unlikely to establish relationships only with high 
quality customers taking this political mandate at face value.  
 32
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We address endogeneity of relationships more formally using a simultaneous equation model in 
which we augment the main probit equation (default model) with an additional probit equation 
that explains which factors influence relationships (relationship model). We use a bivariate 
probit model as both default and the existence of a relationship are binary variables and test the 
null hypothesis that the contemporaneous error terms of both equations are uncorrelated 
instrumenting for relationships and in particular the existence of a checking account, which is 
usually the first relationship that a customer builds with a bank. Identification requires an 
exogenous variation along the relationship / non-relationship margin that is uncorrelated with 
borrower default and, therefore, we propose an instrument that measures the availability of 
savings banks to customers in their region.
18 More precisely, we use the natural logarithm of the 
number of branches over population as our main instrument. This variable is constructed using 
the number of all branches of each savings bank and the number of inhabitants of the particular 
region the bank is operating in. The underlying intuition is that a customer is more likely to have 
a checking account with a savings bank if the bank has more branches in that region relative to 
the population. Our instrument thus proxies for the average distance between depositors and 
savings banks. The smaller this distance the more likely the customer has a relationship with the 
bank. The regional principle, i.e. savings banks can only engage in business with people living in 
their region, facilitates the use of this instrument in our setting. We collect data for each savings 
bank on a very detailed basis. We know for each bank the number of branches operating in each 
of the 439 regions or districts (“Kreisebene”) in Germany. Appendix 3 provides more 
information about all German banks, the total number of branches in Germany and the average 
number of branches in each district. Our key identifying assumption is that the availability of 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Berger et al. (2005) or Hellmann et al. (2008) who use a similar line of arguments to identify 
relationship building of banks with firms. 33
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savings banks in a particular region influences the initiation and existence of a bank-depositor 
relationship but does not explain the default behavior of subsequently issued loans. 
 
We include a second instrument in some specifications that additionally captures the availability 
of savings banks relative to all other banks that have branches in the same region. Using the 
branch level information about all German banks detailed in Appendix 3, we construct a 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) for each region. Evidently, savings banks have the largest 
branch-network throughout Germany followed by Deutsche Postbank AG (now owned by 
Deutsche Bank AG) and the cooperative banks (Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken).
19 The mean HHI 
is 0.22, the minimum HHI is 0.12 and the maximum HHI 0.45, respectively.  
 
Technically, the relationship model and the default model constitute a bivariate qualitative 
dependent variable model where the error terms are uncorrelated with our instrument, are 
distributed as bivariate normal with mean zero and each has a unit variance (Greene (2003) and 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998)). ρ is the correlation between the error terms. If the correlation is 
zero, we get consistent coefficients with the probit estimation of the default model, i.e. there are 
no unobservable characteristics that make relationship customers less risky than non-relationship 




                                                 
19 Hackethal (2004) provides more information about the German banking system. 
20 Application of this approach with two binary dependent variables can be found, for example, in Evans and 
Schwab (1995) who study the causal effect of attending high school on the probability of attending college and 
Hellmann et al. (2008) who study the relation between a bank’s venture capital investments and future lending. 34
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The results of the bivariate probit model are presented in Table 10. We report both the 1
st stage 
(relationship equation) and the 2
nd stage (default equation). The relationship models include all 
control variables as shown in the previous analyses along with the instruments. The first column 
reports the results from the probit model for comparison. Model (1) includes our main instrument 
(Log(Branches/Population)), model (2) adds Log(HHI) as additional instrument. Panel A of 
Table 10 reports the results from the 1
st stage relationship equation. The coefficient of the 
instrument model (1) confirms our expectation that an increase in the number of branches 
relative to the population also significantly increases the likelihood that loan applicants have a 
checking account relationship with their savings bank. Staiger and Stock (1997) propose a test 
for the strength of the instrument under the null hypothesis that the instrument is not significantly 
different from zero. We can reject this hypothesis at any confidence level and our instrument 
clearly passes the threshold for this F-Test (the F-statistic is 61.45). In model (2), we add 
Log(HHI) as a second instrument. While the coefficient of Log(Branches/Population) does 
hardly change, the coefficient of Log(HHI) is also positive and significant suggesting that the 
more savings bank branches relative to other bank branches exist in a particular region the more 
likely does the applicant has a relationship with the savings bank.
21 Panel B of Table 10 reports 
the results of the 2
nd stage default equation. The coefficient and marginal effects are shown. 
Model (1) shows the results using Log(Branches/Population) as instrument, model (2) adds 
Log(HHI) as second instrument consistent with the order of the 1
st stage tests in Panel A. Most 
importantly, the result for the existence of a checking account in the 2nd stage does not differ 
from the results before: Customers with an existing checking account still have a significantly 
                                                 
21 The F-statistic of the first stage regression is also significant rejecting the null hypothesis that both instruments are 
equal to zero. An overidentification (Hansen-J)-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term of the outcome equation. In an earlier version of this paper, we use Log(HHI) as 
sole instrument and also reject the null that the instrument is weak at any confidence level. The results for both 
relationship and default equation are qualitatively similar to using the combination of both instruments.  35
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lower default probability than other customers, and the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
The diagnostic section reports the Wald test under the null hypothesis that the correlation 
between the error terms is zero. We cannot reject this hypothesis at conventional levels 
suggesting that there are no unobservable factors that would simultaneously affect the existence 
of a checking account and default probability. These results suggest that our main results remain 
unchanged even after controlling for the possibility that relationships may proxy for unobserved 
higher quality of relationship borrowers. 
 
B.7. Default probabilities and sample selection: Screening and monitoring 
In the previous specifications, we test whether relationships in various forms, scope and depth 
affect the likelihood that a borrower defaults on a new loan. The results – both for the separate 
and the joint analysis of different relationship variables – suggest that relationships that existed at 
the time of loan origination reduce loan default rates. However, our sample is censored because 
we can observe the performance of the loans only if the applicant received credit. As shown by 
Heckman (1979), censored samples can lead to biased estimates if the errors in the default 
equation are correlated with the way as to how our sample was selected, or, in other words, with 
the banks’ screening process. If this screening process is based on quantitative credit scores 
alone (i.e. which can be controlled for in our selection equation) or a deterministic function 
thereof, screening does not lead to biased estimates in the default equation if we do not control 
for the selection process (Boyes et al., 1989). If the banks’ screening process is not deterministic 
but includes elements of subjective assessment which are also correlated with the errors in the 
default equation, the estimators in the default equation might be biased.  
 36
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A similar argument provided for using the bivariate probit model earlier applies here: being 
approved for a loan and default are both qualitative variables which has to be accounted for in 
modeling the selection problem. Technically, the loan approval model and the default model 
constitute a bivariate qualitative dependent variable model in a similar way as the relationship 
and the default model discussed above but with partial observability (Poirier (1980)) as the 
applicants who were denied credit are not included in the default equation, i.e. the dependent 
variable is not always observed. Indexing individual customer applications by i and the savings 
bank to which the application is submitted by j , the selection equation is  
 
ij ij ij w z P J    '
* . 
 
The regression model is 
ij ij ij x y H E    ' , 
 
where  ) , ( ij ij H P  are assumed to be bivariate normal >@ U VH, , 1 , 0 , 0 . 
 
*
ij z  is not observed; the variable is observed as  1   ij z  if  0
* ! ij z  and 0 otherwise with probabilities 
) ' ( ) 1 Pr( ij ij w z J I      and  ) ' ( 1 ) 0 Pr( ij ij w z J I      .  1   ij z  indicates that the savings bank j accepts 
the loan application i (selection model); I  is the standardized normal cumulative distribution 
function.  it y is the default model. This model corresponds to the probit model with sample 
selection and maximum likelihood estimation provides consistent, asymptotically efficient 
estimates of the parameters in both equations (Van den Ven and Van Pragg (1981)). 37
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The model is estimated using MLE. The explanatory variables in the loan granting and default 
equation are identical. In different model specifications, we add Log(Branches/Population) and 
Log(HHI)  as instruments to the  selection equation for identification.
22 The intuition for using 
Log(Branches/Population) as an instrument is similar to our endogeneity tests. The more savings 
bank branches are available to customers the more likely will these customers apply for loans at 
one of these branches. However, while savings banks are expected to provide their services to all 
customers in their region, this political mandate does not extend to loan market relationships. In 
other words, a different way to phrase the question we are analyzing in this section is: Do 
savings banks establish loan market relationships only with (in an unobservable way) high 
quality customers? At the same time, we treat bank-depositor relationship as completely 
exogenous based on our previous results. Log(HHI) captures the level of competition for each 
savings bank as measured by the number of competitor branches that operate in the same region 
in which a savings bank operates. The choice of this variable is motivated by the evidence in 
papers such as Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Black and Strahan (2002), that more competition in 
banking markets has a positive effect on credit supply. This means that a savings bank is 
expected to be less likely to approve a loan application if there are fewer competitors. The 
empirical results suggest that this is indeed the case and thus confirm the evidence for U.S. 
banks. The higher the HHI in a given savings bank region, i.e. the fewer competitors operate in 
that region, the lower is the acceptance of consumer loans within these savings banks. 
 
                                                 
22 The selection model can be identified without using an instrument but would then rely deterministically on the 
non-linearity of the selection equation.  38
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The results are reported in Table 11. Panel A of Table 11 shows the results from the selection 
equation, Panel B the results from the default equation, respectively. Model (1) includes our 
main instrument (Log(Branches/Population)), model (2) adds Log(HHI) as additional 
instrument. The diagnostic section reports the correlation between the two models (ρ) and its p-
value. Again, if ρ =0, both models can be separately estimated without selection bias. If ρ≠0, 
then unobservable borrower quality is clearly important in the loan granting process that 
potentially biases our estimates in the default equation if we do not carefully control for the 
selection. 
 
Panel A of Table 11 shows coefficient estimates and the respective standard errors. We find that 
loan applicants are more likely to be approved if they have a previous transaction account 
relationship with the savings bank. If the variables in the loan granting and default equation have 
opposite signs, then this variable affects the loan approval decision and default probability 
differently, for example, an applicant is more likely to be rejected based on one variable and this 
characteristic is also positively associated with default probability. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that a bank’s screening policy is designed to minimize default rates. We find that 
all variables that are significant in both the approval and default model carry the opposite signs, 
which is consistent with this interpretation and in line with what we would expect.  
 
The coefficient of Log(Branches/Population) is positive and significant indicating that a greater 
presence of savings banks increases the likelihood of a loan market relationship keeping the 
population size constant. However, the coefficient of Log(HHI) is negative and significant. I.e. 
more competition increases the likelihood that loan applications are approved which echoes the 39
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results found in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Black and Strahan (2002).  The estimate of the 
correlation that maximizes the likelihood is insignificant. The coefficient of the relationship 
variable is still negative and significant. Moreover, correcting for sample selection does not 
change the magnitude of the coefficient. Having a relationship with the bank reduces the 
probability of default by 0.4%, ceteris paribus, suggesting that prior relationships allow for better 
monitoring by banks reducing default rates. Table 12 reports the results using alternative proxies 
for bank-borrower relationships.  Our previous results, however, remain unchanged. 
 
Taken together, observing both loan applications and the performance of the originated loans 
allows us to contribute an important aspect to the literature on the value of relationships, namely, 
the value of ex-ante relationship specific information (that existed before the start of the 
application process) in both screening and ex-post monitoring of the borrower. 
 
4. Private Information and Borrower Incentives to Default 
In the previous discussion, we highlight the benefit of relationships beyond screening of loan 
applicants and link this to an enhanced monitoring ability of relationship lenders. Another 
interpretation of our results could be that lower default rates of relationship borrowers mirrors 
lower incentives of these borrowers to default.
23 This could be because of a number of reasons. 
In particular, the borrower may have concerns about asset setoffs or may have concerns about 
                                                 
23 Another reason why default is not automatic is that loan officers may restructure a loan in order to avoid 
recognizing a default. Such restructurings are more likely to favor customers that have a variety of accounts and 
long relationship with the bank as well as customers with high account balances. The interpretation would therefore 
be more consistent with favoritism of particular customers rather than private information. As we can only observe 
loan performance of loans that have been originated during our sample period, we exclude all loans to customers 
who have more than one loan in our sample. This approach, of course, is much more conservative and does not only 
exclude restructuring loans but also new loans to the same customer and our sample drops by 32 percent following 
this method. However, our results continue to hold. 40
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future credit rationing.
24 Even though the borrower could divert their assets from the bank prior 
to default, if they maintain multiple accounts or access many services there can be costs to doing 
this.  Further, borrowers who maintain an extensive relationship with their bank (particularly, as 
it is frequently the case in Germany, if this is the sole bank relationship they have) worry about 
jeopardizing this relationship if they default on their loans, for fear of reducing their future credit 
availability. For example, 95 percent of our sample borrowers have a credit line in combination 
with their transaction account. These loan commitments facilitate short term borrowing if 
households are credit constrained. Or, to say it differently, it is indicative for households to be 
financially constrained if they do not have access to credit lines. This argument is similar to the 
results in Sufi (2009), who shows that U.S. firms with low levels of cash flow and high covenant 
violations are less likely to obtain credit lines. Given even sparser outside financing options, 
credit lines (and relationships in general) might be even more important for households. Put 
together this suggest that borrowers may have reduced incentives to default on loans taken from 
a bank with which they have relationships. 
 
In this section, we investigate this further.  In order to do this we are able to access detailed 
information about transaction account behavior for a subset of our sample borrowers. This 
information is private and thus only known to the bank and is available immediately before the 
loan is applied for. However, this information is not part of the internal rating even though it is 
available in a quantitative score. Our empirical approach includes this behavioral score as control 
variable in our regressions in addition to all other relationship proxies. The behavioral score is 
the most direct measure of a bank’s private information from the transaction account relationship 
                                                 
24 In Germany a bank has the legal right to access other customer assets held with the bank if the customer defaults 
on a loan. 41
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with the borrower taking even positive and negative information into consideration. The 
coefficients of our relationship proxies should therefore show any additional effect of bank-
borrower relationships on default rates net of a banks’ private information. Our behavioral score 
is a comprehensive measure of the transaction account activity of a borrower and comprises, 
among other factors, the number of transaction accounts, the maximum balance during the last 
six months, the percentage of months with a negative balance during the last 6 months, the usage 
of the credit limit, the percentage of months in excess of the credit limit, sum of account credits 
of the last months relative to the average account credits of the last six months, the number of 
return debit notes during the last six months and the longest period of a declining maximum 
account balance. The factors are weighted with respect to their power in predicting borrower 
defaults (based on out of sample data) and summed to a single behavioral score. The average 
score is 576. A higher score indicates positive information from the borrower’s transaction 
account behavior. 
 
We report the results in Table 13. The dependent variable is the 12-month-default rate. Models 
(1) to (5) successively include the transaction account based relationship proxies. Model (6) 
includes all transaction and savings account related proxies as well as dummy for a prior loan 
lending relationship. We also include the behavioral score as private information proxy. We 
show only marginal effects and multiply the marginal effect and standard error of the behavioral 
score with 1,000 for illustrative purposes here and in all following tables. In all models, the 
behavioral score is negative and significant suggesting that private information that exists prior 
to the loan origination date reduces borrower defaults, which is consistent with our earlier 
results. The economic significance is similar to what we observe with regard to the relationship 42
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proxies. A one standard deviation increase in the behavioral score decreases the default rate by 
0.2%. In other words, we find that private information is a significant determinant of loan default 
rates. Furthermore, the coefficients of our relationship proxies remain significant even after 
controlling for private information. These results suggest that other factors are important at 
explaining borrower defaults and our results point to borrower incentives. Having a credit line 
has the largest effect on the 12-month default rate supporting our earlier conjecture that losing a 
credit line and becoming credit constraint is a serious concern for borrowers. Model (6) includes 
several dummies for savings account balances and, obviously, borrowers are less likely to default 
if they have larger balances in their accounts that can be seized in the event of default. 
 
In a next step, we use selection models similar to above to separate the effect of private 
information into screening and monitoring. We use a Heckman selection model with two probit 
equations and Log(Branches/Population) as instrument. Table 14 reports the results using the 
existence of a relationship as relationship proxy and the behavioral score as measure of the 
bank’s private information. The coefficients of the control variables remain unreported. 
Consistent with our results in Tables 11 and 12 we find that the availability of savings banks in 
the regions increases the likelihood that borrowers obtain loans. We also find evidence for the 
importance of screening. In the selection equation, the coefficient of the behavioral score is 
positive and significant, i.e. positive information from transaction accounts (or being a higher 
quality customer) increases the chance of being approved by the loan officer as does having a 
relationship. This supports our interpretation: netting out the private information component 
from the relationship measure, our results suggest that loan officers anticipate the reduced 
incentives of borrowers to default and incorporate this information in the lending decision. The 43
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default equation shows the corresponding results with both private information and relationships 
being negatively associated with defaults. The contemporaneous correlation between the error 
terms of selection and default equation is insignificant. Table 15 shows the results from a 




Using a unique database of the universe of consumer loans by savings banks in Germany, we 
investigate if relationship loans default less, and the sources of value of relationships. We find 
that relationships between banks and retail customers prior to a loan application significantly 
reduce the default rates of loans given to these customers. We find relationships matter in 
different forms (transaction accounts, savings accounts, prior loans) and scope (credit and debit 
cards, credit lines) and depth (relationship length, utilization of credit line, money invested in 
savings account). Our results suggest that relationships even in the form of simple transaction 
and savings account are economically important, even after controlling for detailed borrower 
characteristics and their internal and external credit scores. Hence, from a practical viewpoint, 
our results suggest that having people open simple savings or checking accounts can enable 
banks to make better credits. 
 
We next investigate the reasons behind lower default rates or put differently where the sources of 
value of prior relationships lie.  We are able to access data that has information not only on loan 
performance, but also on the determinants for the loan approval decision, including the 
quantifiable credit information on the customer.  Our results suggest that relationship customers 44
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have a much higher likelihood of receiving a loan than new customers.  But, these customers also 
have a significantly lower default probability than new customers after controlling for the bank’s 
loan acceptance decision. Importantly, prior relationships allow the bank to produce information 
that goes beyond publicly available information and allows it to better assess loan applicants’ 
creditworthiness. These results suggest that relationships provide value to banks in the screening 
process of loan applications by retail customers. At the same time, relationships also provide 
value beyond the improvement in the initial screening process.  
 
The results in this paper highlight that relationships matter in multiple dimensions. We find that 
the private information banks accumulate over the course of a relationship is an important factor 
in consumer lending. It matters in screening loan applicants.  However, even after a loan has 
been originated, relationships help reduce default.  We have evidence that private information 
from relationships is important here in monitoring but relationships also potentially add value in 
shaping borrowers’ incentives to default. They thus fill an important gap left by the existing 
literature on the benefits of bank relationships.  
 
Our results suggest that relationships are an important source of private information used by 
banks. There are a number of important open questions for future research.  Are there other 
sources of unobservable private information that loan officers incorporate into their decisions?  
Does use of such discretion improve the lending decision or lead to favoritism or cronyism? We 
hope to address these questions in future research.  45
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Definition of Relationship Variables  
 
Relationship Dummy 
Relationship (Yes/No)  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan applicant had a checking account with the same bank before the application.  
The regional principle excludes the possibility that a borrower has relationships with multiple sample banks. 
   
Relationship Length 
Relationship <2years  Dummy variable equal to1 if the relationship length is shorter than 2years. 
Relationship >=2, <5years  Dummy variable equal to1 if the relationship length is between 2 and 5 years. 
Relationship >=5, <9years  Dummy variable equal to1 if the relationship length is between 5 and 9 years. 
Relationship >=9, <15years  Dummy variable equal to1 if the relationship length is between 9 and 15 years. 
Relationship >=15  Dummy variable equal to1 if the relationship length is longer than 15 years. 
   
Scope of Relationships: Cards & Checking Account Information 
Debit and Credit Card  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has both credit and debit card from the savings bank. 
Debit Card  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has a debit card but not a credit card from the savings bank. 
Credit Card  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has a credit card but not a debit card from the savings bank. 
No Cards  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has neither a credit card nor a debit card from the savings bank. 
   
Scope of Relationships: Credit Line 
Credit Line (Yes/No)  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has a credit line (which is an overdraft facility associated with the  
checking account). 
Used > 150%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has used more than 150% of the credit line. 
Used  >120%, <= 150%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has used more than 120% but less of equal to 150% of the credit line. 
Used > 100%, <=120%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has used more than 100% but less of equal to 120% of the credit line. 
Used > 80%, <=100%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has used more than 80% but less of equal to 100% of the credit line. 
Used > 20%, <=100%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has used more than 20% but less of equal to 100% of the credit line. 
Used > 0%, <=20%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has used more than 0% but less of equal to 20% of the credit line. 
Positive account balance  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has a positive checking account balance. 
   
Scope of Relationships: Assets held in the Bank (Yes/No) 
Assets (Yes/No)  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has accounts with the savings bank other than checking accounts  
(e.g. savings account, brokerage account). 
   
Scope of Relationships: Assets held in the Bank (Amount) 
< 50 EUR  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has less than 50 Euro in accounts other than checking accounts. 
>50 EUR , < 2000 EUR  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has between 50 and 2000 Euro in accounts other than checking accounts. 
>=2000 EUR  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower has more than 2000 Euro in accounts other than checking accounts. 
   
Transaction Account Behavior 
Behavioral Score  A quantitative score of a borrower’s transaction account activity prior to loan origination. It comprises information such as the  
number of transaction accounts, the maximum balance during the last six months, the percentage of months with a negative  
balance during the last 6 months, the usage of the credit limit, the percentage of months in excess of the credit limit, sum of  
account credits of the last months relative to the average account credits of the last six months, the number of return debit  
notes during the last six months and the longest period of a declining maximum account balance. The factors are weighted  
with respect to their power in predicting borrower defaults (based on out of sample data) and summed to a single behavioral 
score. 
   
Instruments   
Log(Branches/Population)  Natural logarithm of the number of savings bank branches over the population in the area the respective savings bank is  
operating in. 
Log(HHI)  Natural logarithm of the Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index (HHI) which measures the competition among banks.  
The number of branches of each particular bank are used to construct the HHI. 
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Definition of Control Variables  
 
Income   
Log(Income)  Log(Income) is the natural logarithm of the monthly net income of the applicant measured in Euro. 
Repayment Burden 
(% of Income) 
This variable measures the applicant’s burden to repay the loan and is defined as the sum of monthly repayment  
(principal plus interest) over monthly net income. We use 5 different categories: less than 5%, 5% to 11%,  
11% - 13%, 13% - 20% and more than 20%. The higher the ratio, the higher the likelihood that the borrower  
might have troubles to repay the loan. 
< 5%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the repayment burden is below 5%. 
>= 5%, < 11%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the repayment burden is between 5% and 11%. 
>=11%, < 13%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the repayment burden is between 11% and 13%. 
>=13%, < 20%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the repayment burden is between 13% and 20%. 
>20%  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the repayment burden is above 20%. 
Undisclosed  Dummy variable indicating that repayment burden is undisclosed. 
Age 
18 to 23 years  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower is between 18 and 23 years old. 
23 to 25 years  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower is between 23 and 25 years old. 
25 to 30 years  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower is between 25 and 30 years old. 
30 to 45 years  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower is between 30 and 45 years old. 
45 to 50 years  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower is between 45 and 50 years old. 
50 to 60 years  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower is between 50 and 60 years old. 
> 60 yers  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower is more than 60 years old. 
Borrower Industry 
Borrower Industry  Borrower Industry' comprises the different industries the applicants are working in (we use dummy variables 
for each industry): Service, Metalworking, public service, construction, communication. Energy and water supply,  
etc. Further included are dummies for unemployed applicants, retirees, etc. 
Job Stability 
<=2 years  This variable is a measure of job stability. The variable takes the value 1 if the borrower was 2 years or less in her  
durrent job. 
> 2 years  The variable takes the value 1 if the borrower was more than 2 years in her current job. 
Internal Rating 
Rating 1 – Rating 12  We segregate the internal rating score in 12 different rating categories based on the default probability of the borrower.
Category 1 is the lowest, category 12 the highest default probability, respectively. 
External Rating   
Rating 1 – Rating 8  We segregate the internal rating score in 8 different rating categories based on the default probability of the borrower.  









Banks and branches in Germany 
This table presents an overview of the different banks and the number of their respective branches which are used to calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann-Index (HHI) which is used as an instrument in the paper. 
 
Bank Name  Total # Branches  Average # Branches 
Aareal Bank AG  10  0.02 
Baden-Württembergische Bank AG  53  0.12 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG  58  0.13 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG  639  1.46 
CC-Bank AG  78  0.18 
Citibank  287  0.65 
Commerzbank AG  812  1.85 
CreditPlus Bank AG  13  0.03 
DaimlerChrysler Bank AG  9  0.02 
Delbrück Bethmann Maffei AG  11  0.03 
Deutsche Bank AG  765  1.74 
Dresdner Bank AG  725  1.65 
DVB Bank AG  1  0.00 
GE Money Bank  85  0.19 
Oldenburgische Landesbank AG  206  0.47 
ReiseBank AG  70  0.16 
SEB AG  180  0.41 
Bankhaus Max Flessa KG  28  0.06 
Fürstlich Castell´sche Bank  19  0.04 
Hanseatic Bank GmbH & Co KG  30  0.07 
Privatbankiers insgesamt  178  0.41 
Reuschel & Co KG  9  0.02 
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg  221  0.50 
Landesbank Berlin - Girozentrale  162  0.37 
Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale  3  0.01 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale  115  0.26 
Savings Banks  13,850  31.55 
Badische Beamtenbank eG  87  0.20 
Deutsche Apotheker- und Ärztebank eG  47  0.11 
DZ-Bank AG  11  0.03 
norisbank AG  100  0.23 
PSD Bank  27  0.06 
Sparda-Banken eG  389  0.89 
Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken  12,372  28.18 
Deutsche Postbank AG  13,772  31.37 
Other Banks  1,987  4.53 
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This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 1,068,000 consumer loans originated by German savings banks from November 2004 
through June 2008. The number of observations corresponds to the number of approved loan applications. 
 
 
   N  Mean  SD  Min  p25  p50  p75  Max 
Loan Characteristics                 
Approved
1)  1,091,999  0.978  0.147  0  1  1  1  1 
Loan Performance Characteristics               
Default Rate (12 months)  1,068,000  0.006  0.077  0  0  0  0  1 
Borrower / Applicant Characteristics             
Borrower Income                 
Income (monthly)  1,068,000  1,769  1,378  0  1,256  1,600  2,030  758,087 
Age                 
18 to 23 years  1,068,000  0.048  0.215  0  0  0  0  1 
23 to 25 years  1,068,000  0.047  0.211  0  0  0  0  1 
25 to 30 years  1,068,000  0.123  0.329  0  0  0  0  1 
30 to 45 years  1,068,000  0.365  0.481  0  0  0  1  1 
45 to 50 years  1,068,000  0.123  0.328  0  0  0  0  1 
50 to 60 years  1,068,000  0.168  0.374  0  0  0  0  1 
> 60 years  1,068,000  0.126  0.332  0  0  0  0  1 
Repayment Burden (% of Income)               
< 5%  1,068,000  0.074  0.262  0  0  0  0  1 
>= 5%, < 11%  1,068,000  0.277  0.447  0  0  0  1  1 
>=11%, < 13%  1,068,000  0.066  0.248  0  0  0  0  1 
>=13%, < 20%  1,068,000  0.128  0.334  0  0  0  0  1 
>= 20%   1,068,000  0.066  0.248  0  0  0  0  1 
Undisclosed
2)  1,068,000  0.388  0.487  0  0  0  1  1 
Job / Industry                 
Unemployed  1,068,000  0.007  0.086  0  0  0  0  1 
Service Sector  1,068,000  0.238  0.426  0  0  0  0  1 
Metal Working Industry  1,068,000  0.204  0.403  0  0  0  0  1 
Public Sector  1,068,000  0.134  0.341  0  0  0  0  1 
Retired  1,068,000  0.116  0.321  0  0  0  0  1 
Construction Work  1,068,000  0.057  0.232  0  0  0  0  1 
Other
3)  1,068,000  0.239  0.426  0  0  0  0  1 
Job Stability                 
<=2 years  1,068,000  0.170  0.376  0  0  0  0  1 
> 2 years  1,068,000  0.830  0.376  0  1  1  1  1 
External Rating                 
External Rating Score  86,628  4.256  2.359  1  2  4  6  8 
 
1)  Number of observations is number of loan applications. 
2)  In the regressions we combine the >=20% and the undisclosed categories; using undisclosed as separate category does not change our 
results. 
3)  “Other” comprises the following industries: Communications and information; Energy and water supply, mining; Hotel and catering; 
Municipalities; Agriculture; Banking; Insurance; Not for profit company. It also comprises: Unemployment; Housewife; Apprentice; 
High School Student; Student; Army; Houseman; Civil Service 52
ECB





This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 1,068,000 consumer loans originated by German savings banks from November 2004 
through June 2008. The number of observations corresponds to the number of approved loan applications. All variables are proxies for the 
existence and scope of bank-borrower relationships: (1) existence of a relationship and relationship length, (2) transaction accounts, (3) 
savings accounts and (4) prior consumer loans. 
 
   N  Mean  SD  Min  p25  p50  p75  Max 
Relationship Characteristics                 
Relationships (Yes)  1,068,000  0.975  0.156  0  1  1  1  1 
Relationship Length                 
Relationship < 2 years  1,041,291  0.050  0.218  0  0  0  0  1 
Relationship >= 2, <5 years  1,041,291  0.093  0.291  0  0  0  0  1 
Relationship >= 5, <9 years  1,041,291  0.160  0.366  0  0  0  0  1 
Relationship >= 9, <15 years  1,041,291  0.209  0.407  0  0  0  0  1 
Relationship >=15 years  1,041,291  0.488  0.500  0  0  0  1  1 
Scope of Relationships: Transaction Accounts               
Debit and credit card  1,041,291  0.465  0.499  0  0  0  1  1 
Debit card  1,041,291  0.038  0.190  0  0  0  0  1 
Credit card  1,041,291  0.183  0.387  0  0  0  0  1 
No cards  1,041,291  0.289  0.453  0  0  0  1  1 
Credit line  1,041,291  0.945  0.228  0  1  1  1  1 
Used > 150%  1,041,291  0.013  0.114  0  0  0  0  1 
Used > 120%, <=150%  1,041,291  0.016  0.127  0  0  0  0  1 
Used > 100%, <=120%  1,041,291  0.049  0.216  0  0  0  0  1 
Used > 80%, <=100%  1,041,291  0.187  0.390  0  0  0  0  1 
Used > 20%, <=80%  1,041,291  0.303  0.460  0  0  0  1  1 
Used > 0%, <=20%  1,041,291  0.063  0.243  0  0  0  0  1 
Positive account balance  1,041,291  0.301  0.459  0  0  0  1  1 
Scope of Relationships: Savings Accounts               
No savings account  1,068,000  0.232  0.422  0  0  0  0  1 
< 50 Euro  819,913  0.197  0.398  0  0  0  0  1 
>= 50, < 2000 Euro  819,913  0.363  0.481  0  0  0  1  1 
>= 2000 Euro  819,913  0.185  0.388  0  0  0  0  1 
Prior Consumer Loans                 
Prior loan (yes)  1,068,000  0.192  0.394  0  0  0  0  1 
Prior loan with 1 year look-back  1,068,000  0.121  0.326  0  0  0  0  1 
Prior loan with 2 year look-back  1,068,000  0.174  0.379  0  0  0  0  1 
Prior loan with 3 year look-back  1,068,000  0.192  0.394  0  0  0  0  1 
 53
ECB
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Table 5   
Private information from savings accounts and borrower defaults 
This table presents the results of a probit regression. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
borrower defaults within the first 12 months after loan origination. Our main inference variables are relationships 
characteristics as a result of relationships via savings account (the existence of savings accounts and assets held in 
these accounts). All variables are defined in Appendix I. In model (2), the omitted relationship variable is assets > 
2000 Euros. The coefficients for borrower industries (as described in Appendix I) as well as intercept and time fixed 
effects are not shown. Only the marginal effects are reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered 
at the bank level are shown in parentheses.
 ***,
**,




  (1)  (2) 
Relationship Characteristics         
Scope of Relationships:  
Assets held in the Bank (Yes/No)         
Savings Accounts  -0.004***  <0.001     
Scope of Relationships:  
Assets held in the Bank (Amount)         
No Assets      0.005***  (.001) 
< 50 EUR      0.004***  (.001) 
>50 EUR , < 2000 EUR      0.001***  <0.001 
Borrower Characteristics         
Log (Income)  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001 
Repayment Burden (% of Income)         
< 5%  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002***  (.001) 
>= 5%, < 11%  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.003***  (.001) 
>=11%, < 13%  -0.002**  (.001)  -0.001***  (.001) 
>=13%, < 20%  -0.001  (.001)  -0.001**  (.001) 
Age         
18 to 23 years  0.013***  (.003)  0.011***  (.003) 
23 to 25 years  0.011***  (.002)  0.010***  (.002) 
25 to 30 years  0.008***  (.002)  0.007***  (.002) 
30 to 45 years  0.006***  (.001)  0.005***  (.001) 
45 to 50 years  0.005***  (.001)  0.004***  (.001) 
50 to 60 years  0.004***  (.001)  0.004***  (.001) 
Job Stability         
<= 2 years  0.004***  <0.001  0.003***  <0.001 
         
Borrower Industry  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Diagnostics         
Prob > Χ²  0.000  0.000 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -36,840.39  -36,793.20 
Pseudo R
2  5.76%   .88% 
# of observations  1,068,000  1,068 00  
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Table 6   
Private information from prior consumer loans and borrower defaults 
This table presents the results of a probit regression. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
borrower defaults within the first 12 months after loan origination. Our main inference variables are relationships 
characteristics based on repeat lending with different look-back windows. Prior Loan within 2 yr (1yr) look-back are 
dummy variables equal to 1 if the borrower was granted  a loan within  2 years (1 year) prior to the current loan. # 
Prior Loan Defaults measures the number of loans the borrower defaulted on in the past and which were originated 
during our sample period. All variables are defined in Appendix I. The coefficients for borrower industries (as 
described in Appendix I) as well as intercept and time fixed effects are not shown. Only the marginal effects are 




denote significance levels at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Relationship Characteristics             
Prior Consumer Loans             
Prior Loan (Yes/No)  -0.003***  <0.001         
Prior Loan within 2 yr look-back      -0.003***  <0.001     
Prior Loan within 1 yr look-back          -0.003***  <0.001 
Past Loan Performance             
# Prior Loan Defaults  0.022***  (.003)  0.022***  (.003)  0.022***  (.003) 
Borrower Characteristics             
Log (Income)  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001 
Repayment Burden (% of Income)           
< 5%  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001 
>= 5%, < 11%  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002***  (.001) 
>=11%, < 13%  -0.001**  (.001)  -0.001**  (.001)  -0.001**  (.001) 
>=13%, < 20%  -0.001  (.001)  -0.001  (.001)  -0.001  (.001) 
Age             
18 to 23 years  0.010***  (.002)  0.010***  (.002)  0.010***  (.002) 
23 to 25 years  0.008***  (.002)  0.008***  (.002)  0.008***  (.002) 
25 to 30 years  0.006***  (.001)  0.006***  (.001)  0.006***  (.001) 
30 to 45 years  0.005***  (.001)  0.005***  (.001)  0.005***  (.001) 
45 to 50 years  0.004***  (.001)  0.004***  (.001)  0.004***  (.001) 
50 to 60 years  0.003***  <0.001  0.003***  <0.001  0.003***  <0.001 
Job Stability             
<= 2 years  0.004***  <0.001  0.004***  <0.001  0.004***  <0.001 
Borrower Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Diagnostics             
Prob > Χ²  0.000  0.000  0. 00 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -31,947.6   -32,040.09  -32,222.08 
Pseudo R
2  18.27%  18.04%  17.57% 
# of observations  1,068,000  1,068,000  1,068,000 
# of bank clusters 296 296 29658
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1395
November 2011
 
Table 7   
Combinations of relationship measures and borrower defaults 
This table presents the results of a probit regression. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
borrower defaults within the first 12 months after loan origination. Model (1) repeats the analysis from model (6) in 
Table 4 and model (2) adds whether or not the borrower also had a savings account. Model (3) considers whether 
borrowers had simultaneously checking and savings accounts at their bank. Model (4) adds whether or not the 
borrower had a prior loan during our sample period controlling for previous loan defaults to model specification (2). 
The coefficients for borrower industries (as described in Appendix I) as well as intercept, bank and time fixed 
effects are not shown. Only the marginal effects are shown. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors clustered at 
the bank level are shown in parentheses.
 ***,
**,




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Relationship Characteristics                 
Relationship Length                 
Relationship <2years  0.011***  (.001)  0.010***  (.001)      0.007***  (.001) 
Relationship >=2, <5years  0.006***  (.001)  0.005***  (.001)      0.004***  <0.001 
Relationship >=5, <9years  0.003***  <0.001  0.003***  <0.001      0.002***  <0.001 
Relationship >=9, <15years  0.001***  <0.001  0.001***  <0.001      0.001***  <0.001 
Scope of Relationships:  
Cards & Checking Account 
Information                 
Debit and Credit Card  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001      -0.001***  <0.001 
Debit Card  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001      -0.001***  <0.001 
Credit Card  -0.001**  <0.001  -0.001*  <0.001      -0.001***  <0.001 
Scope of Relationships: Credit Line               
Used > 150%  0.003***  (.001)  0.003***  (.001)      0.003***  (.001) 
Used > 120%, <=150%  -0.00002  <0.001  0.0001  <0.001      0.001  <0.001 
Used > 100%, <=120%  -0.001*  <0.001  -0.0005  <0.001      -0.0001  <0.001 
Used > 80%, <=100%  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001      -0.001***  <0.001 
Used > 20%, <=80%  -0.004***  <0.001  -0.004***  <0.001      -0.003***  <0.001 
Used > 0%, <=20%  -0.003***  <0.001  -0.003***  <0.001      -0.002***  <0.001 
Positive account balance  -0.005***  <0.001  -0.005***  <0.001      -0.004***  <0.001 
Scope of Relationships:  
Assets held in the Bank (Amount)                 
Checking Accounts          -0.003***  (.001)     
Savings Accounts      -0.002***  <0.001  -0.001  (.001)  -0.001***  <0.001 
Savings Accounts x  
Checking Accounts          -0.002  (.002)     
Prior Consumer Loans                 
Prior Loan (Yes/No)              -0.002***  <0.001 
Past Loan Performance                 
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Table 7 (cont’d) 
 
  (1)  (2  (3)  (4) 
Borrower Characteristics                 
Log (Income)  -0.001***  <0.001  -0.001***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.001***  <0.001 
Repayment (% of Income)                 
< 5%  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  <0.001  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002***  <0.001 
>= 5%, < 11%  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002***  <0.001 
>=11%, < 13%  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002***  (.001)  -0.002**  (.001)  -0.001***  <0.001 
>=13%, < 20%  -0.001**  (.001)  -0.001**  (.001)  -0.001  (.001)  -0.001**  <0.001 
Age                 
18 to 23 years  0.003**  (.002)  0.003**  (.002)  0.012***  (.003)  0.002**  (.001) 
23 to 25 years  0.003**  (.001)  0.003**  (.001)  0.010***  (.002)  0.002**  (.001) 
25 to 30 years  0.002**  (.001)  0.002**  (.001)  0.008***  (.002)  0.002**  (.001) 
30 to 45 years  0.002***  (.001)  0.002***  <0.001  0.006***  (.001)  0.002***  <0.001 
45 to 50 years  0.002***  (.001)  0.002***  <0.001  0.005***  (.001)  0.002***  <0.001 
50 to 60 years  0.002***  <0.001  0.002***  <0.001  0.004***  (.001)  0.001***  <0.001 
Job Stability                <0.001 
<= 2 years  0.003***  <0.001  0.003***  <0.001  0.003***  <0.001  0.002***  <0.001 
Borrower Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Diagnostics                 
Prob > Χ²  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -32,869.785  -32,771.56  -36,807.12  -28,094.10 
Pseudo R
2  10.96%  11.23%  5.84%  23.90% 
Number of observations  1,041,291  1,041,291  1,041,291  1,041,291 
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